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FEDERAL TAX LIENS- A STUDY IN
CONFUSION AND CONFISCATION
B. BERNARD WOLSON*
The importance of the subject matter in this discussion cannot be
over-emphasized in view of the peculiar development of the law in the
field of Federal tax liens. We shall not discuss tax priorities governed
by the Bankruptcy Act under Section 64 or Section 67 and Chapter X
and XI. Nor shall we discuss Section 3466 of the United States
Statutes dealing with tax priorities in estates or other special taxes, as
the fit tax lien or the distilled spirits lien or maritime liens. This has
been the law since 1879. We shall concern ourselves with the subject
of the general federal tax lien law, its impact upon finance problems,
its conflicts with state lien laws and exemption law, and the overall
dangers that may accrue by our failure to understand the all embracing
extent of the general tax lien. We are discussing federal collection
law, which is now an important part of substantive tax law and busi-
ness law.
The federal tax liens law being a creature of statute, our first step
is to determine from the statute the nature, extent and impact of its
terms upon property rights and the latent mischief which it has created
in the commercial world.
Under Section 6321 of the 1954 Revenue Code, it is provided:
If a person against whom an assessment has been made neglects
or refuses to pay the amount assessed after demand, a lien in
favor of the United States is created against all the real and
personal property belonging to the taxpayer in the amount
assessed and costs and interest.
You will note at once that the statute does not say the government
lien is prior. It simply says that the government shall have a lien on
the property of the taxpayer. Nor does the statute say what is "pro-
perty", or which law, state or federal, interprets the word "property".
Hence much is judicial interpretation, and therein lies the headache.
The problem that immediately arises is: What property or rights
belong to the taxpayer at the moment the tax lien comes into opera-
tion? That question is complicated by the fact that while what is a pro-
perty right that "belongs to" the taxpayer is governed by state law,'
the issue of priority between a federal tax lien and a competing lien
is a federal question. 2
*L.L.B., B.S. in Bus. Admn.; Associate Editor, Commercial Law Journal;
Toledo, Ohio Bar.
'United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). The Code does not create any prop-
erty rights but merely attaches the rights created under the applicable law.
2-United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1958). The court in United States v.
FEDERAL TAX LIENS
Numerous and important cases come to mind that revolve around
this issue. But before we discuss the cases and to what property rights
the tax lien attaches, we must first determine when the lien attaches.
The statute, Section 6322 states: "The lien shall arise at the time the
assessment is made," and the assessment list is received by the Direct-
or. Goldstein v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 152 F. Supp. 856 (1958).
Within sixty days thereafter, the District Director is, by Section 63030,
required to send notice after assessment to the taxpayer assessed and
demand payment. Regulation 301.6301-1 (a) says that failure to give
the notice within sixty days after assessment does not invalidate the
notice. If the demand is made, even though informal, the lien ataches
automatically at the time of assessment.3
In other words, the lien comes into being when the assessment is
noted on the secret records or "summary record," as it is called, of the
District Director's Office, which records are generally not available to
the public.4 And herein lies the major problem. The government tax
lien is thus a secret lien and entraps the public into transactions which
presumably appear free and clear of any liens-in which transactions,
credit is extended. 5 The nature of the lien is such that it is tantamount
to an encumbrance on property and subjects it to the payment of the
tax. It is in the nature of a secured claim whereby the government has
an interest in taxpayer's property, thus securing to the government a
privileged position superior to that of taxpayer's creditors whose
liens, notwithstanding, may have been prior in time.6 We were taught
in law school that if a lien is prior in time, it is prior in right. That
doctrine, while theoretically still correct, is somewhat abrogated in tax
American National Bank of Louisville, 255 F. 2d 504 (5th cir. 1958) said that
liens for federal taxes and the manner for this enforcement are matters which
are governed by federal laws. Also see United States v. Bleasby, 153 F. Supp.
724 (D.N.J. 1957). The general tax lien is a sweeping lien and embraces all
kinds of property including tangible property and equitable interests. What is
"property" is well defined in Citizens State Bank v. Vedal, 114 F. 2d 380 (10th
cir. 1940). The court in determining that a "debt!' is "property," down down
three tests: 1) that it is subject to ownershp; 2) that it is transferable; 3) that
it can beb rought under the dominion of a court by any of its usual processes.
The federal courts' disregard of state interpretation is exemplified in Deitsch
v. Bd. of Liquor License Comm., 58-1 USTC f19496 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1958) where-in it was held that a state liquor license is "property" although under state law
it is not so regarded.
S1nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §6322.4The secret lien is defended by the government on the ground that if the
government filed its lien in all instances for the general public to know, the
credit of the taxpayer would be impaired or destroy it. The secret lien is
criticized by others on the ground that secrecy entraps creditors into extend-
ing unsecured credit to the taxpayer who is doing his job carrying on his
business for the benefit of the government at the expense of creditors. See
Felton, What the Supreme Court says about the Federal Tax Lien, 37 Taxes
45 (1959).
5 United States v. Saslavsky, 160 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).6 The federal tax lien has the effect of a judgment. Nat'l. Trust etc. Bank
v. United States, 135 F. 2d 527 (9th Cir. 1943).
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law by the fact that tax liens are not ordinary liens-they are liens
of a sovereignty and a sovereign can do no wrong.7 Not only is the
doctrine of sovereignty a limiting factor to the "first in time, first in
right" doctrine, but also the sovereign's interpretation of the state
statutory lien and contractual lien law limits the doctrine. The
federal court's invention of the words "inchoate" and "unper-
fected," as we shall see, have defeated considerable liens that have
heretofore been considered valid by reason of priority in time. For
example, a mechanic's lien filed according to statute for all the
world to know, is inferior to the government's secret lien assessed
in its office, say a year later, because, says the Supreme Court of the
United States, the mechanic's lien is an "inchoate and unperfected
lien" until it is reduced to judgment." We shall discuss the cases later.
Thus, the mechanics or materialmen who furnished goods or services
to the taxpayer are entrapped into giving their service and property
for nothing to the government on account of the taxpayer's unpaid
taxes. One author aptly describes the government as one who "robs
Peter to pay Paul's taxes".9 In this manner, the government acquires
rights in property more than the taxpayer has himself. It is incredible,
but true! To otherwise explain this anomaly, let us consider the legal
nature of property or title thereto. We have traditionally considered
title to be property, be it realty or personalty, as a bundle of rights.
The taxpayer owns part of this bundle and various lien holders own
the rest of this bundle. Now comes the government, who, without
being required to file its tax lien so the public may know of its exist-
7The court in United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), said that the govern-
ment lien creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, feder-
ally defined, to rights created under State Law. The court in Pipola v. Chicco
169 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) defined the assessment as an administra-
tive determination that one is indebted to the government for taxes-in effect,
it is a judgment for taxes found due. The lien is defined as the means au-
thorized by law to protect the government's position as a creditor.
s The early cases preferred the antedated state lien over the federal tax lien.
See list of cases in 63 YALE L. J. 905 at 908 n. 16. Frank R. Kennedy, The
Relative Priority of tie Federal Government., The Punicious Cancer of the
Inchoate and General Lien. However, in Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80(1929) the United States Supreme Court for the first time launched the doc-
trine of the inchoate and general lien and held that the federal priority defeats
an antedated lien that is not choate. The inchoate lien doctrine took on strength
in Ill. ex rel Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 262 (1946). Here the state re-
corded its unemployment compensation lien which by statute became a first lien
on the personal property of the employee. In order to protect its security, the
state had a receiver appointed and had the court enjoin other creditors from
attempting to interfere with the property. The court found that this lien was
not "sufficiently specific or perfected" for federal tax purposes. Hence the lienor
was identified; the amount of the lien was certain; but the court held the prop-
erty to which the lien was attached was uncertain since the lien was on "all the
personal property used in the business." That is a fluctuating and variable
matter. This case further stands for the doctrine that in addition to the
requirement of identity, certainty and definiteness, "perfection" required a
transfer of title or possession.
9 Win. T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L.
REV. 459.
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ence, nullifies that part of the bundle of rights owned by the other
lienors. Thus the government obtains property rights against the tax-
payer which do not even belong to him. A builder may build a $10,000
home for a purchaser and not get a dime-so he files his lien. After
the filing, the government's lien arises and prevails over the builder's
prior lien. The government isn't taking the land owner's property to
pay the owner's taxes, but takes that of the builder to pay the land
owner's taxes.10 By standards of state law, this is federal confiscation.
At this point, we might consider that part of the tax law which
protects certain categories of people. The secret and unfiled tax lien
is not, under Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
valid against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors
who have filed and recorded according to state law. We shall later
discuss the rights and problems, and there are many, even among this
protected class.
Before we discuss the categories of cases where tentacles ot the
tax lien consume and become superior to prior filed liens, let us
consider the usual types of property to which the general lien attaches.
As has been said, the general tax lien attaches to all the property of
the taxpayer-and this includes anything that is subject to ownership
capable of transfer and subject to jurisdiction in the process by a
court. The tax lien automatically attaches not only to all such property,
but also to the after-acquired property of the taxpayer"' and against
third persons for services rendered and materials furnished. In short,
the federal lien has a built-in after-acquired property clause. The
secret lien attaches to the bank accounts of the taxpayer, including
deposits made after the lien arises, rights to liquidating dividends or
distribution, to equities of redemption 1 to landlords for rent, and the
10 Even where a gambler loaded his car with gambling equipment and he him-
self was loaded with the cash of others, all of which was confiscated under the
New York gambling laws, all was ordered turned over to the government on
the theory that this was property of the taxpayer and the government had a
lien. United States v. Lenci, 160 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. N.Y. 1958).
"Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945). The federal tax lien also
prevails over a previously recorded security interest in such after-acquired
property, whether or not it relates to future advances. United States v. Phil-
lips, 198 F. 2d 634, (5th Cir. 1952) as to future advances. Stockholders Publish-
ing Co. v. Smith, 56-1 USTC 19420 (S.D. Cal. 1956) as to substituted security
for a prior debt. Also see United States v. Phillips, 198 F. 2d 634 (5th Cir.
1952) and United States v. Saslavsky, 160 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
Here there was a conflict of the government with an attorney who created
funds for a client-taxpayer against whom a lien existed. The government con-
tended the fund was "after-acquired" property. The attorney claimed a lien
for his fees. The government won and counsel received nothing. As to "after-
acquired" increased cash value of an insurance policy held by a bank as secur-
ity, the court held in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Nat. Bank of Miami
Beach,- F. Supp. - (S.D. Fla. 1958) that the government must pre-
vail as to the increased cash value in the policy. Also see United States v.
People's Bank, 197 F. 2d 898 (5th Cir. 1952).
12 Government's lien against a conditional vendee is good against vendor for
sums paid by the conditional vendee which could be procurred in an unjust
19591
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
government can even force a transferree in fraud to account for tax
due the government from grantor. The tax lien probably attaches to
property which by law or by special provisions of the contract are not
transferrable without the consent of a state or a third party as a fran-
chise or liquor license or a leasehold. Stagecrafters Club v. D. C. Divi-
sion of Amer. Legion, 110 F. Supp. 481, (D.D.C. 1953), 211 F. 2d 811
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
Lawyers dealing with creditor-debtor relations are confronted
with numerous problems. For example, if you garnishee wages and a
secret tax lien intervenes before a court issues a pay-in-order, what
happens? Or what happens if you garnishee the debtor of a judgment
debtor and a secret tax lien intervenes? Likewise, what is the result
if you make a settlement or a common law composition with a debtor-
taxpayer against whom a secret lien exists, and he uses funds and
property subject to the lien to make the settlement? If "A", for
example, owes "B", the taxpayer, $1,000, and a secret lien exists, "B"
then settles his acount with "A" for $500, what are the rights of the
government against "A" for the balance? Suffice it for the present to
answer these questions by stating that the sovereignty generally will
prevail. The government is not bound by the rights of any third per-
sons except in the statutorily protected group. It is not bound by
creditors' agreements; by rights of joint tenants, executory contracts,
assignments or assignments for the benefit of creditors, assignment of
wages, atachment liens, open-end mortgages, surety liens, liens for
services,1 3 set-offs or defenses of third parties to the tax debtor, or
trust mortgages for the benefit of creditors,1" state lien and exemption
laws,' 5 and yes, even warehousemen's liens. 6 And if ths is law, what
of a bank who honors a check of a depositor against whom a secret
tax lien exists? What of the state statutory lien of a lawyer on the
papers, money and property of his taxpayer client for services ren-
dered, which property the lawyer has in his possession and which
property or money his services created? What about the buyer of
realty on land contracts where the owner-taxpayer is subjected to a
secret tax lien and the property is sold? Can the buyer get his money
enichment action under local law. Bensinger v. Davidson 147 F. Supp. 240
(S.D. Cal. 1956).
'3 As to legal services, see United States v. Saslavsky, 160 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957) and United States v. Pay-o-Matic Corp., 162 F. Supp. 154, aff'd
256 F. 2d 581 (2d Cir. 1958).
14 In Rev. Rule 56-592, the service ruled that a "Trust Mortgage" executed to
trustees for the benefit of unsecured creditors of taxpayer is not a mortgage
within meaning of Section 6233. Therefore, trustees under such a trust mort-
gage do not have priority over a subsequently recorded federal tax lien. The
contrary position taken in Benjamin Gorgill, Trustee, 218 F. 2d 556 (1st cir.
1955) will not be followed by Internal Revenue Service.
is United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) held: State insurance exemptions are
inoperative-to prevent attachment of liens created by federal statutes.
16 Styles v. Eastern Tractor Co., 154 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
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back? The reader now has sufficient background in the problems so
that we may now examine some significant cases and decisions in the
field of tax lien priorities.
Attachments and Garnishments
The United States Supreme Court on January 10, 1955, made two
important decisions. One was United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211
(1955), which involved an attachment lien; the other, United States v.
Liverpool Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955), involved a garnishment lien.
In both cases the tax lien of the government arose after the attachment
and garnishments were filed. The Acri case was one where certain bonds
and cash were attached under the Ohio law. The attachment suit was
filed and judgment was subsequently obtained. However, before the
judgment was rendered, the government tax lien arose. The Ohio
Supreme Court held that under Ohio law an attachment is an execu-
tion in advance and the lien is perfected at the time of the attachment.
Therefore, the Ohio court held, that the Acri case is distinguishable
from other types of cases such as United States v. Security Trust and
Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). In the Security Trust case the plain-
tiff secured an attachment lien against four parcels of real estate of the
defendant. Thereafter, a federal tax lien arose against the defendant
and was later filed, after which plaintiff got judgment. The court held
the federal tax lien superior. The court held the attachment was a
mere notice of a more perfect lien to come. The Security Trust case
was the first to apply the term "choate" to a tax priority issue in sol-
vency cases." The government took the Acri case to the United States
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said the Ohio court's distinc-
tion between the Security Trust case and the Acri case is immaterial
for the purposes of federal tax law, and that an attachment lien in the
state of Ohio is for federal tax purposes an inchoate lien, because, at
17 Prior to the Security Bank case, the federal courts gave literal interpreta-
tions to the doctrine of "first in time, first in right" and respected state
statutes as to their respective interpretation of what is a valid lien. Pro-
fessor Frank Kennedy in his excellent article on the Relative Priority of the
Federal Government, etc., 63 YALE L. J. p. 905 lists in his note 115, at page
924, thirty cases involving mechanic's liens, equitable liens of sureties, gar-
nishment liens, assignments, local tax liens, statutory liens of landlords, etc.
in all of which priority was granted over a federal tax lien. However, all
these cases were decided before the Supreme Court spoke in the Security
Bank case. Some lower courts, thereafter rebelled against the seeming
inequity of the Security Bank case and have obderrately resisted the efforts
of the government to enforce the law of the Security Bank case. Thus in
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F. 2d 118 (10th Cir.
1952), the surety's equitable lien was held prior to the federal tax lien. Even a
conditional sale was upheld against a federal tax lien in United States v.
Anders Contracting Co., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 700 (W.D.S.C. 1953). A material-
man's lien, too, was sustained as superior to a government tax lien in United
States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., 62 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1953). The impact
and implications were recognized as revolutionary in several Law Review ar-
ticles of that day. 39 GEo. L. J. 496 (1956) ; 35 mNN. L. Rav. 580 (1951); 26
N.Y.U.L. REv. 373 (1951).
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the time of the attachment, the fact and amount of the lien were con-
tingent upon the outcome of the suit for damages upon which the attach-
ment was based. Even the argument that the plaintiff did everything it
could to protect its lien by attachment was held untenable. The court
relied upon United States v. Security Trust, etc., 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
The argument-that once the judgment was obtained, the effect thereof
was retroactive to the date of the attachment lien-was likewise held
controvertible. Moreover, the Acri case held: the determination of
when a lien is choate is a federal question.' 8
In the case of United States v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215
(1955), the subject of litigation was a fund due under a fire insurance
policy. A garnishment was served on the insurance company in connec-
tion with a suit on an open account. After judgment against the de-
fendant (debtor-taxpayer) but before the court issued a pay-in-order
for the garnishor, the federal tax lien arose. The court, citing the Acri
case and the Security Trust case, held the federal tax lien paramount to
that of the garnishor. 19
At this point we should discuss another oft used argument of the
attaching lineor. He argues that Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 excepts a judgment creditor from the secret lien priority,
and that as such the lienor is within the protected class as a judgment
creditor. The courts have consistently held that an attachment lienor
is neither a "purchaser" nor a "judgment creditor" within the meaning
of the Statute, Section 6323, allowing protection to lienors in such
categories ;20 that attachment proceedings are merely notices to acquire
a lien yet to arise and therefore an "unchoate" lien; that attachment
proceedings are contingent interests which are not determined until
judgment; that even judgments are not enough where the state law
requires more to be done to secure a judgment lien. 2 The question is-
what about states which by the terms of their statutes give attachment
liens an immediate lien upon filing of the proceedings? The govern-
18 The court said: "The State's characterization of its liens while good for all
state purposes does not necessarily bind this court." Also see United States v.
Lenci, 160 F Supp. 715 (E.D. N.Y. 1958); Leipert v. R. C. Williams & Co., 161
F. Supp. 355 (S.D. N.Y. 1958); United States v. Pay-o-Matic Corp., 162 F.
Supp. 154, aff'd 256 F. 2d 581 (2d cir. 1958) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.
v. New York Housing Authority, 157 F. Supp. 87, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) as to non-
retroactivity of mechanical lien, see United States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66(1958).
19 In Oxford Distributing Co. v. Famous Roberts Inc., 173 N.Y.S. 2d 468(1958), the government filed its tax lien after the judgment creditor got hisjudgment. The judgment creditor then brought a third party proceedings
and succeeded in causing the taxpayer-debtor to surrender a liquor license and
thereby created a fund. Government lien was held paramount.
20 MacKensie v. United States, 109 F. 2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940) ; United States v.
Hawkins, 228 F. 2d 517 (9th Cir. 1955).
21 Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F. 2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948); Beeghly v. Wilson,
152 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1957); Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F. 2d 178 (3d
Cir. 1956).
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ment's answer to that is: that notwithstanding what the state statute
says, the federal courts have the right to re-examine the state statutes
and only the federal interpretation thereof governs. Ill. v. Campbell,
329 U.S. 362 (1946) and United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955)
hold that state given liens are a matter of federal court interpretation
and are binding even though the state court has custody of the property
in question. The rationale of the federal courts is that the attachment
lien is unperfected since both the fact of the lien and the amount
thereof is unknown until the outcome of the suit. United States v.
Jewel Hankins, 228 F. 2d 517 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Se-
curity Trust and Savings Bank of San Diego, 340 U.S. (1950).
Mechanic's Liens
Nowhere does there appear greater inequity than in the mechanic's
lien area, where the decisions permit the enforcement of federal taxes
at the cost of innocent third parties who improved or even created the
property of the taxpayer or who relied upon the credit of taxpayer's
property-all before the secret tax lien existed.
Mechanic lienors suffered three setbacks in the United States Su-
preme Court.
1. In United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) the Supreme
Court reversed without opinion the Colorado Supreme Court
which held that a prior recorded mechanic's lien had priority
over a federal tax lien.2 2
2. United States v. Collotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955), involved tax
liens which arose during the work and before mechanic's lien
were perfected.
3. In United States v. White Bear Brewing, 350 U.S. 1010
(1956), the court subordinated the mechanic's lien of a mechanic
who completed his work, filed his lien and commenced fore-
closure proceedings before the tax lien arose. The court suc-
cinctly held the lien inchoate. 23
Under present law, the prior filed mechanic's lien is subordinated
to a later secret federal tax lien arising thereafter. The courts in the
said three cases have applied the "choate" tests set forth in the New
Britain case.2 4 In applying the choate lien doctrine in the foregoing
cases, we can readily say that the private lienor is identifiable; the
22 Aquilino v. United States, 3 N.Y. 2d 511, 146 N.E. 2d 774 (1957), involved taxes
of a contractor. It was there held that the government may take the proceeds
and the tax lien prevails over the rights of those whose labor and materials
erected the property and for which they had a mechanic's lien.
23 See also United States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958) reversing 102 So. 2d 599
Fla. 1958). Also see Shott, Admr. v. Peoples Bank, 157 N.E. 2d 47 (1957),
where it was held that a federal tax lien prevails over an adverse mechanic's
lien which arises prior in time but has not become perfected or made choate.
The court defined "choate" as when the lien is perfected so there is nothing
more to be done; when the identity of the lienor, property subject to the lien
and the amount of the lien, are established.
24 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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property is the particular realty improved by the mechanic. Although
the amount is presumably the correct price, the courts say that the
amount is not determined and certain until the courts have reduced
the amount to judgment. Hence, they are inchoate, and the later fed-
eral tax lien prevails. The theory of the courts is that the mechanic's
lien is not a property right, but a substtiute for a property right, or an
intent to assert a property right.
The Effect of White Bear Brewing Case on Real Estate Titles
The White Bear Brewing case25 was one where the lienor had com-
menced foreclosure proceedings before the federal tax lien arose. The
Supreme Court gave priority to that lien that arose after the equity
suit was filed.
A basic and cardinal principle of law is the doctrine of Lis Pendens,
that if an interest is acquired during the pendency of a suit, that in-
terest is bound by the decree of the court. 26 Suppose we have an equity
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien or a suit involving title to realty after
which the government lien arises. Isn't the government bound by the
law of Lis Pendens? This was argued in the White Bear Brewing
case, but the court did not decide that question. It stepped aside from
the issue. Can the government sit by in a foreclosure action, let the
property go to decree of foreclosure and sale, and then step in and
take over the realty for its lien? At this point it seems so.
If the government is not bound by Lis Pendens, real estate lawyers
have enormous problems confronting them. Any attorney foreclosing
a mortgage must then check for revenue liens every day until sale day
or the date on which the sheriff executes his deed. Now supposing
the revenue lien does arise after the sale, what steps do the lawyers
take to clear the title? Will a new suit be required to clear the title
pursuant to Section 7424 of the Internal Revenue Code? What hap-
pens to the costs, attorney fees and expenses of suit which would
ordinarily be covered by the mortgage lien, or payment of mechanic's
liens or other liens in the foreclosure action that are considered in-
choate ?27
And speaking of mortgages, what about a mortgage foreclosure
under a power of sale contained in the instrument rather than by
judicial procedure, and a federal tax lien arises subsequent to mort-
gage but prior to mortgagee's sale-can the government lien be cut
out? The Sixth Circuit says "NO" in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
2 350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
26 The federal courts have heretofore held that the United States is bound
by the doctrine of Lis Pendens when acquiring a non-tax right in real estate,
United States v. Mayse, 5 F. 2d 885 (9th Cir. 1925) ; United States v. Calcosieu
Lumber Co., 236 F. 2d 196 (5th Cir. 1916).
27 United States v. Ball Construction Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) ; United States v.
Land 155 F. Supp. 195 (D.C. N.H. 1957). It is sought by the American Bar
Association to change §2410 of the Judicial Code, making the doctrine of Lis
Pendens applicable to the government.
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v. United States, 107 F. 2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939). The Fifth Circuit says
"YES" in United States v. Boyd, 246 F. 2d 477 (5th Cir. 1957) cert.
denied in 355 U.S. 889 (1957).
Quaere: Is a mortgage with a power of sale more choate than a
mechanic's lien? We do not know.
Miscellaneous Liens
What is the status of the lien of an attorney to whom 25% interest
in a cause of action had been assigned? It was held inchoate and sub-
ordinate to federal tax lien arising thereafter because: judgment fixing
the amount for the attorney was not rendered and therefore not de-
termined as a sum certain. United States v. Goldstein, 58-1 USTC,
19478; 256 F. 2d 581 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
Re: New Haven Clock etc. Co., 253 F. 2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958), where the
amount was unknown, therefore inchoate; First State Bank of Med-
ford v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 204 (D.C. Minn. 1958); Commer-
cial Standard Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 254 F. 2d 432 (5th Cir.
1958) .2 An equitable vendor's lien was subordinated to a later federal
tax lien on ground that the former was enforceable only by suit-
hence, inchoate until judgment; and further, it is subject to defeat by
a bona fide purchaser.29
But where the taxpayer sold part of his interest in a pending case,
even though a government tax lien had already arisen but was unfiled,
the court held that the attorney was a purchaser and protected under
Section 3672, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as a "purchaser." Sher-
man B. Roth, Inc. (D.C. Mass. 1957), also a district court case, held
a fund in the attorney's hands created by him must first be used to
pay the attorney for his services before the federal tax lien is paid.
C. Sullivan Co., Inc. et al., (D.C. R.I. 1957). These cases preceded
the Goldstein case and the New Haven Clock case.
What is the result where a warehouseman has a lien on goods
stored in his warehouse before a tax lien arises? The government still
won-the "Lien is inchoate," said the court.30
2
8 In United States v. Liverpool and London Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955)
the issue involved the superiority of the tax lien over a garnishment. The ques-
tion of attorney fees was also involved and the court held that since the
garnishor's lien was not prior to the tax lien the attorney fee in the garnish-
ment proceeding could not be prior either. On March 5, 1958 the Court of
Appeals refused to follow the Goldstein case in United States v. Coblentz-
N.E. 2d-(1958) where the court sustained an attorney's lien in a condemna-
tion award. The court said that by his percentage contract, the lawyer became
a "purchaser" in his share. Only the United States Supreme Court can resolve
this conflict. To the same effect see: United States v. Bates, 158 F. Supp. 32
(E.D. Ky. 1957) and Marteney v. United States, 245 F. 2d 135 (10th cir.
1957).
29 United States v. Morrison, 247 F. 2d 285 (5th Cir. 1957). See Morris Sasbosky(D.C. N.Y.) where lien arose before work done.30 Styles v. Eastern Tractor Mfg. Co., 154 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
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Even a Trust Receipt under the Uniform Trust Receipts Law is
held as nothing more than a promise to pay. United States v. Profaci,
137 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. N.Y. 1955).
There is one area where the government has not fared well or made
too many court tests. That is where the lien holder has possession and
maintains such possession by virtue of his lien as an innkeeper, garage-
man, etc., and, while subject to government seizure for sale, the distri-
bution is subject to the possessory lien. In United States v. Gilbert As-
sociates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1952), the court held the priority over a
federal tax lien must rest upon possession by the private lienor. To
protect creditors, the safer security is the possessory one rather than
the non-possessory or changeable one.
Of course, if the federal tax lien is on file prior to the acquisition
of a possessory lien, the federal tax lien prevails without doubt, and
if unfiled, the possessory lienor might claim protection under the
statute as a pledgee-as one holding the property to secure the charges.
Nevertheless in Styles v. Easter Tractor Co., 154 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957), the court held that the lienor is unprotected until he secures
a judgment. In Clyde Lucas, et al., (D.C. N.C.) the district court held
in favor of a federal tax lien over the certificate of a claimed assign-
ment, where the assignee did not have physical possession of the cer-
tificates.
We have thus far been talking about the creditors of the taxpayer
and how the government lien has enveloped the property of creditors;
but the government reaches all forms of property, including rights
against the debtors of the taxpayer. The debtors of the taxpayer have
fared no better than creditors. For example, a taxpayer's debtor was
denied the benefit of the statute of limitations on the debt when the
debt was not barred at the time the unfiled lien arose, but was barred
under state law long before the government sued and levied. 3 The gov-
ernment may be bound, however, when it accepts a derivative right.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
While the debtor is permitted certain defenses such as-that no
debt is due the taxpayer, or that a set-off exists,32 or that prior judicial
process was effected or that the government levy was not valid, the
debtor of the taxpayer is not permitted to contest the merits of the tax
against the taxpayer. The burden, however, is upon the government to
prove ownership of the property or debt due the taxpayer. For ex-
31 United States v. Jacobs, 155 F. Supp. 182 (D.C. N.J. 1957). Also see United
States v. Sommerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
32Banks right of set-off ceases once a federal tax lien has been filed even
though it holds demand obligations created prior to the day the federal tax
lien arises. Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F. 2d 820 (9th Cir. 1957).
In this case the loan was made before the tax lien was filed but after it be-
came a secret lien.
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ample, see United States v. Stock Yards Bank of Louisville, 231 F. 2d
628 (6th Cir. 1956), which involved a distraint upon Series E Savings
bonds jointly held. Also, although a levy by the government against
a debtor reaches only the debt or property held at the time of the levy
and not what there may be later, if the debtor fails or refuses to pay
over to the government such debt, the penalty is 100% of the tax or
the amount not paid over, whichever is the less. Internal Revenue Code
of 1957, Section 6332.
However, in the event the creditor-taxpayer sues the debtor, pay-
ment to the government is a good defense.
One of the more unpalatable debtor cases is Bensinger v. Davidson,
147 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Cal. 1956) where the taxpayer had a tax lien
filed against him and thereafter purchased a house under a land con-
tract, but defaulted after paying to vendor the sum of $17,200. There
the taxpayer-vendee had a right of unjust enrichment against the vendor,
which claim the parties settled. The government disregarded the set-
tlement and determined for itself the amount recoverable. 33
Can a debtor pay his debt to the taxpayer without searching for
secret liens? Yes he can, not by statute however, but by regulation,
provided the debtor has no actual knowledge of a lien. A bank, in
the ordinary course of business with its depositor, without actual notice
or knowledge of the federal tax lien and in absence of fraud or negli-
gence, incurs no liability if payment is made to the depositor or his
order. Also an insurance company may pay or make loans on a policy
if they lack actual knowledge of the lien, because the loan is tanta-
mount to prepayment of the obligation. Bd. of Assessors v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 216 U.S. 517 (1910). But suppose the government
levies on a bank account. It now has knowledge. It pays over the
amount on hand to the government. Must the bank now check the
government records every day in the future to see if the balance of
tax is paid by the taxpayer-depositor? It is important for business
lawyers to constantly be aware that the bank problem of set-offs is-
when does it have the "right?" Held: Not after notice of federal tax
lien. Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F. 2d 820 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 738 (1958).
The tax priority decisions have put in jeopardy open end mort-
gages; i.e. a mortgage providing that additional loans made after the
original one shall be secured by the same mortgage. However, until
the additional loan is made there is no perfected loan with respect to
3 3 Inequity was compounded in Leipert v. R. C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355(S.D. N.Y. 1957), government again defeated persons acquiring houses under
a Land Contract where purchaser had possession but not title, it was held:
Purchaser is not a "purchaser" under the protecting statute-worse, buyer
could not get his money back because vendee's lien was too "inchoate." The
doctrine that possession is notice to all the world is meaningless where a tax
lien is involved.
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it, and an intervening federal tax lien has priority over later loans on
the prior mortgage. The same rule applies to a recorded pledge, chattel
mortgage or bill of sale given as security, where a creditor is obligated
thereunder to give additional credit in goods or money, and an inter-
vening federal tax lien arises. The federal lien invariably takes pri-
ority.34 Whenever a revolving fund or ever changing property exists
such as annuities and accounts receivable or changing inventory as
security, the federal tax lien prevails. 35
The argument that the lien relates back to the date of mortgage is
futile, since the lien as to funds to be advanced at a later date is
deemed inchoate as to that amount to be advanced.
The impact of the Ball Construction case 36 on mortgage security
has actually upset the financial circles. Until the Supreme Court spoke
in that case it was thought that Section 6323 (a) Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 protected mortgages properly filed with the secret federal tax
lien imposed by Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code. More-
over, the 1956 Revenue Ruling further protected obligatory advances
34 United States v. Peoples Bank, 197 F. 2d 898 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v.
Lord, 155 F. Supp. 105 (D.C.N.H. 1957). Definitely contracted for obligatory
advances made under a properly executed and recorded construction loan mort-
gage "were excepted from the open end mortgage" rule by an unpublished
ruling A-619373--8/24/56, but this was before the Ball Construction decision.
35 An interesting aspect of assignments and a revolving fund is found in the
assignment of accounts receivable in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
The Ratner case stands for the principle that a reservation or exercise of
dominion over property assigned to secure a loan will invalidate the security
of the assignment. The New Haven Clock & Watch Co. Debtor case (Chap. X
in Bankruptcy) 253 F. 2d 577 (1958) came later, and held that since there
was dominion exercised over the security by the holder of the security, it
was not subject to Federal taxes and was the true security of the bank, the
assignee. The court in the New Haven Clock case decided that, based upon
the state law (Conn.), this assignment was valid. Quaere: What if this was
not in bankruptcy and a government tax lien intervened, would the court
recognize the assignment as creating a choate lien in the revolving fund?
The court did apply the "choate doctrine" to the demand for attorney fees
by the bank, stating that the bank lien on the fund for attorney fees was
"inchoate" and so did not precede the government tax lien. The Ball Con-
struction case, 355 U.S. 587 (1958) may give us the answer-that no matter
what the dominion over accounts receivable, as long as it is unspecific and
revolving, it involves an inchoate lien, and therefore subject to a federal tax
lien.
36 United States v. Ball Construction Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958). While the case in-
volved a contest between the government and a surety on the contractor's sure-
ty bond, the decision has an effect on mortgagee's rights to a lien for contrac-
tual disbursements made after a federal tax lien is recorded. The events of the
Ball case were: 1. performance bond was executed and the bonding company
got a pledge of the contract proceeds as security; 2. tax lien of the contractor
recorded; 3. contractor defaulted and the bonding company finished the job
with its funds after which contractor's proceeds were due to the bonding com-
pany. When the government contested the right of the bonding company to take
the proceeds, the Supreme Court of the United States merely stated that the
bonding company's lien was inchoate and held the government lien prior.
The tragedy of this case is that when the federal tax lien was recorded the
bonding company was under contract to fulfill its commitment and finish
the job, and it had no freedom of choice. Then the government sat by and
grabbed the developed asset.
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"definitely contracted for and required to be made under a properly
executed and recorded construction loan mortgage." If the Ball de-
cision considers funds not paid to a mortgagee as subordinate to a
secret federal tax lien, it places all bank loans in jeopardy. If the bank
should not advance the future funds to the taxpayer-mortgagor under
its agreement, what is the liability of the bank to the taxpayer mort-
gagor? We find no case to answer this question.
The Ball case has created another uncertainty in the law. Hereto-
fore no one would question the right of the mortgagor to extend his
security to interest generally, and even after a tax lien is filed.3 7 Since
some interest will accrue after the federal tax lien is filed, and therefore
is "inchoate" or "unperfected" or "not determined" until after the lien
is filed, will the after-accrued interest suffer the same fate as the after-
advanced funds by a bank in open end mortgage cases?
The same issue arises as to contractual liens for mortgagee's fore-
closure expenses, for insurance or any other act to be done for the
benefit of the property. In at least two cases, the courts seem to hold
against the mortgagee's priority.3
The Ball case stands as a warning against those who take a security
for a future or contingent obligation, the theory being that if the obli-
gation is contingent and does not exist, there can be no security for it
and the lien is therefore unperfected and inchoate. 39
Another area where the impact of the Ball Construction case will
be felt is in the commercial field where the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, the Factors Act, the Inventory Lien Law, and the Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Acts, exist. The open end mortgage theory as ap-
plied to the federal tax lien will likely apply since the lender must gen-
erally file a notice that he is going to do business under one of the
above mentioned acts. He does not and practicably, cannot, check for
federal tax liens every day. All business done under these acts is in
constant jeopardy.
But worse-an important instrument in the banking business is the
letter of credit. A customer asks a bank to issue a letter of credit to a
37 Glenn v. Ames Surety Co., 160 F. 2d 799 (6th Cir. 1947). In United States v.
Lord, 155 F. Supp. 195 (D.C. N.H. 1957), the court said specifically that the
mortgage is entitled not only to priority on principal but also on the interest,
but that was before the Ball Construction case. See United States v. Samp-
sell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946).3 8 Re New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F. 2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958). Legal
expenses have been allowed priority though incurred after tax lien in the
Sampsell case, but this was before the Ball Construction case. See United
States v. Lord, 155 F. Supp. 105 (D.C. N.H. 1957). When priority was denied
for payment of insurance and taxes required under the mortgage.
39 Recent application of this doctrine is found in United States v. Ringles, 166 F.
Supp. 544 (D.C. Ohio 1958). Here an attorney was given a mortgage for fu-
ture services. Liens for taxes were filed against the mortgagor. Held: the at-
torney could receive only the dollar value for services actually rendered. The
balance due for services after the lien was filed was inferior to the tax lien.
1959]
MARQUETTE LAW REVEI4
third party in which the bank agrees to honor drafts of that third
party. As the drafts are sent the bank does honor them, and to be
certain of payment, the bank often desires security. Is the bank lien
on this security choate so as to supercede a later arising federal tax
lien? It is probably unlikely because the lien is inchoate, for it is not
even known if and when a draft will be sent by the customer! Unless
the law is changed, the sanctity of commercial transactions is up-
rooted.
Construction loans, crop and livestock mortgages, chattel mortgage
clauses in leases, wage and rent assignments and assignments of earn-
ings under a contract, fluctuating inventories given as security, all are
in jeopardy because of the Ball Construction case.
Does this Ball Construction case put in jeopardy subrogation by
insurance companies in tort cases when the cause of action arises in
the plaintiff, after which a tax lien arises? Does the lien have priority
to the subrogation? We do not yet know.
Another area of serious importance is the problem arising out of
purchases of automobiles. Those who lend on automobiles as security
generally rely solely upon a certificate of title. If the government has
filed a lien against the taxpayer-owner and a loan is made solely upon
the title showing it free of lien, the lender's lien is inferior. Yet few
lenders go beyond the certificate of title to the automobile. Thus in
Merchants Loan Co., 57-2 USTC, fJ9741, (D.C. Ariz. 1957), the court
held a tax lien superior to a chattel mortgage lien on a motor vehicle
where tax lien was filed first even though not filed with the Bureau
of Motor Vehicles as required by state law.40
In jointly owned property with survivorship, the government can
enforce partition and enforce the tax lien against taxpayer's share to the
exclusion of other owners. United States v. Brandenburg, 106 F. Supp.
82 (S.D. Cal. 1952). The same is true as to joint bank accounts. United
States v. Third National Bank and Trust Co., 111 F. Supp. 152 (M.D.
Pa. 1952).41 State-granted exemptions in life insurance are ineffective
against a government secret tax lien, for the government can take the
cash value even after death, in the hands of the beneficiary, United
States v. Bess, 42 provided the lien attached before death. If no lien
4UTo same effect, see Union Planters National Bank v. Godwin, 140 F. Supp.
528 (E.D. Ark. 1956). Kelly Kar Co. v. United States, 56-1 USTC 9481
(SD. Cal. 1956); Merchants Loan Co. v. United States, 57-2 USTC 9741(D.C. Ariz. 1957); Liberty Bldg. Co. v. Riddell, 53-1 USTC 19404 (S.D.
Cal. 1953).
41 The same rule exists as to co-owned United States Savings Bonds, United
States v. U.S. Stockyards, 231 F. 2d 628 (6th Cir. 1956).
42357 U.S. 51 (1958) a curious part of this opinion is that the court limited the
government's priority to the cash surrender value because the balance of the
proceeds consisted of property in which the decedent himself has no interest
under State law. Here the court defines what is "property" based upon state
law. Should this be different from other state law interpretation. In re New
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accrued until after death, the government does not get a lien on any of
the proceeds . Commission v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958). This is also
true while the taxpayer is living. Knox v. Great West Life Ins. Co.,
212 F. 2d 207 (6th Cir. 1954).
Even a spendthrift trust, whether protected by the contract giving
rise to the trust, or protected by the law of the state, is subject to an in-
tervening government lien.43 In re Rosenberg's Will, 269 N.Y. 247, 199
N.E. 206 (1936) ; likewise see: United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank,
152 F. 2d 582 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Leuschner v. First Western Bank &
Trust Co., 57-2 USTC 19734. In a revocable trust, if the tax lien arises
against the trustor, i.e. against the one with the power of revocation,
the government may force revocation. The state exemption given to
Workmen's Compensation, 4 employment insurance and disability in-
surance proceeds 45 and even rights to alimony are subordinated to inter-
vening federal tax liens. Fried v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 241 F. 2d 504
(2d Cir. 1957) .46The lien of the government even disregards the state
homestead and exemption laws. United States v. Heffron, 158 F. 2d
657 (9th Cir. 1947).
Some states give the landlord a lien. The landlord's lien suffered
the same fate as other statutory liens. In United States v. Scovil, 348
U.S. 218 (1954) the landlord had a receiver appointed to enforce his
lien against the tenant and his assets were sold for the rent. The govern-
ment secret tax lien arose before the appointment of a receiver. The
United States Supreme Court held that the landlord's lien was not per-
fected in the federal sense because, said the court: "The state law
allowed defendant to file a bond and defeat the lien and the landlord's
lien is only a caveat for a more perfect lien to come." Prior to that,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Waddill etc., Inc., 323 U.S. 353
(1945) said that only after the lien is asserted by way of execution, and
the levying officer severed the goods from the general assets, can the lien
Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F. 2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958) the court upheld
the priority of an assignment of accounts receicable where the creditor as-
sumed sufficient domain over the accounts receivable in accordance with state
law. Here again the court relied upon state law to determine property rights.
See William T. Plumb Jr., Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13
Tax L. Rev. 247, at p. 255 (1957) for a comparative analysis of insurance
and tax lien priorities. Also see Pyle, Liability of Life Insurance, etc. for
unpaid incomze taxes, etc., 9 Tax L. Rev. 205, 325 (1954).
-3 In re Rosenberg Will case, 269 N.Y. 247, 199 N.E. 206 (1936) and in United
States v. Fid. and Dep. Co., 214 F. 2d 565 (5th Cir. 1954) which involved a
homestead exemption, the courts allowed a subordinate federal tax lien to take
exempt property. See United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F. 2d 582
(5th Cir. 1946), 167 F. 2d 468 (5th Cir. 1948).
"United States v. Ocean Accident Co., 76 F. 2d 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).45 Fried v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 241 F. 2d 504 (2d Cir. 1957), Cert. denied,
353 U.S. 922 (1957).
"13Rev. Rul. 89, 1953, 1 Cum. Bull. 474, United States reaches all property
by foreclosing the tax lien including property exempt by state law. United
States v. Hoper, 242 F. 2d 468 (7th Cir. 1957).
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be said to be perfected as against a government's secret tax lien. The
government argument seems to be that the lien to be perfected must
be indefeasable.'7 Actually, the Ball Construction case which extended
the "choateness" doctrine to contractual consensual liens, makes such
liens as landlords' liens, or leases with chattel mortgage clauses, inef-
fective against an intervening federal tax lien.
State and Local Tax Liens
Not only do private persons have their problems with the govern-
ment tax lien, but so does the state. In United States v. New Britain,48
the United States Supreme Court held thus where the statutory lien was
asserted by Pennsylvania under the Pennsylvania Unemployment Com-
pensation law by delivering a writ of execution to the sheriff after
which the government made a secret assessment before the actual ex-
ecution on goods. The court held in Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F. 2d
178 (3d Cir. 1956), that the property was not relieved of a prior fed-
eral tax lien; that until actual execution on the goods, the lien is uncho-
ate. In United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941) the court held a
federal tax lien prior to a state gas tax lien; where statute declared the
state lien to be a first and preferred lien on all property used in tax-
payer's business. The court said that the state lien is neither specific nor
constant and the amount uncertain, and therefore must be subordinated
to the federal tax lien. A basic case is that of Illinois v. Campbell, 329
U.S. 362 (1946), wherein the Supreme Court was confronted with a
lien on all personal property used in business, recorded and filed in
amount and the court still found the state lien inchoate on the tenuous
ground that the lienor could not know what property was subject to the
lien until the inventory was filed. The Gordon case doctrine was again
challenged in United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc.4 9 In the Gilbert
case, New Hampshire's Supreme Court found that a lien of a town
property tax on machinery, which had been foreclosed by advertise-
ment and sale prior to the time that the federal tax lien arose, was a
complete fulfillment of the United States Supreme Court's prerequisite
for a valid prior lien. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N.H. 411, 90 A. 2d
(1952). TheSupreme Court of the United States in 345 U.S. 361
(1953) did not question that the lienor was identified, or that the
amount of the lien was certain or that the property subject to the lien
was definite, but based its holdings on the fact that the taxpayer had
not been divested by the town of either title or possesion. Thus once
4 The rationale of the court was that up to the instant any lien is terminated
by payment there can be no certainty that the lienor will insist upon his full
rights under the lien. How far will the courts go to sustain a position of un-
choateness as to the competing lien? Payment of course distinguishes every
lien; however, perfected otherwise.
48 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
49345 U.S. 361 (1953).
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again we have the Supreme Court adding a fourth requirement to per-
fection of a lien, namely, possession and tifle. Then what about pledges
or statutory possessory liens? The bailee may have possession and by
reason thereof assert a lien; but to require title in addition thereto seems
to be a legal solecism. There just seems to be no completely logical
process that is followed in the fervent effort to hold a federal tax lien
prior in right, although later in time.
In New York v. Maclay et al, 288 U.S. 290 (1933) the court held
the government tax lien paramount over a franchise tax because the
franchise tax was not specific or perfected, since the amount of lia-
bility was unliquidated and unknown.
In City of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929) the federal
tax lien was paramount to the personal property tax of the state be-
cause the lien was inchoate. See also Mass. Bonding Co. v. N.Y., 259
F. 2d 33 (2d cir. 1958).
The Exceptions to Section 6321
As heretofore indicated, mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judg-
ment creditors who become such, or one of them, before notice of the
federal tax lien is filed, are entitled to priority over the federal tax
lien. The federal law governs as to whether a particular individual
qualifies as a member of any of the excepted classes.50 This protection
is afforded members of each of the classes by Section 6323(a).
Mortgagees who have properly filed their mortgages have priority
over federal tax liens filed later. The secret lien is ineffective against
a properly filed mortgage. 51 The fact that a mortgagee has knowledge
of an assessment against a taxpayer and does not execute or file his
mortgage until after such knowledge, is immaterial to the priority of
the mortgage. 52 Open end mortgages as has been noted do not enjoy
the same privilege. 53 In any event, new concern exists as to all mort-
gages other than conventional mortgages notwithstanding Section
6323 (a) (5). For example, a trust mortgage for creditors for pur-
poses of reorganization or composition of debt where the ultimate goal
is to return the business to the debtor has been held to be a "mortgage,"
for the purpose of tax lien priorities, in one case.54 However this was
50 United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
51 Underwood v. United States, 118 F. 2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941). This was applied
to a mortgage for benefit of creditors in United States v. Gorgill, 218 F. 2d
556 (1st Cir. 1955) contra. Rev. Rul. 56-592, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 945.52United States v. Woodside, 40-2 USTC 9492, (D.C. S.C.) United States v.
Beaver Run Coal Co. 99 F. 2d 610 (3d Cir. 1938) Profaci v. Maniapro Realty
Corp., 54-2 USTC 9683 (S. Ct. N.Y.).
53United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank of San Diego, 340 U.S. 47(1950) ; United States v. Ball Construction Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
54See federal lien as they affect mortgage lending. The Bus. Lawyer, Nov.
1957, p. 118; Dangers under Recent Federal Tax Lien Decisions, The Bus.
Lawyer, Nov. 1958, p. 12, also see United States v. Gorgill, 218 F. 2d 556 (1st
Cir. 1955).
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an exceptional case, for the government insists that only "conven-
tional" mortgages are given the protection of the statute.
What is the result where a mortgage is given for an antecedent
debt after the tax lien arises but before the tax lien is filed? The cases
are in conflict. Some cases deny it, and others grant the protection
where consideration in the nature of forebearance or extension can
be shown.55
As to pledgees, the courts have held that they are entitled to priority
only where the pledge rests on a bona fide, valid and actual obliga-
tion. Required also is that the pledge be completed and perfected be-
fore the lien is filed.56
The statute granting priority to purchasers is beset with problems
concerning the issue of who is a "purchaser." Within the meaning
of the statute, a "purchaser" shall be one who "acquires property or
an interest in property, for a valuable consideration" before notice of
the federal tax lien is filed.5 7 Of course, a "dummy" purchaser cannot
qualify to defeat the lien.58 However the statute itself does not specify
when one becomes a "purchaser." Thus its definition has been left
to the courts.
In Leipert v. R. C. Williams & Co.,59 a purchaser of realty on a
land contract basis was not protected as a "purchaser" against an after-
arising federal tax lien. This is so even against a vendee's lien which
was held "inchoate." Not included in the term "purchaser" is the
holder of a landlord's lien,60 attaching creditors81 or mechanic's lien.62
While the statute grants priority to a judgment creditor there are
many judicial ramifications to the interpretation of the term. Generally
speaking, in order to qualify as a judgment creditor one must obtain
a valid judgment for money or property in a court of record having
competent jurisdiction-plus perfecting a lien under the judgment on
55Protection denied in: Felipowicz v. Rothensis, 43 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa.
1942) ; United States v. Franklin Fed'1. Savings, etc., 140 F. Supp. 286 (N.D.
Pa. 1956). Protection allowed: Nat'l. Refining Co. v. United States, 160 F. 2d
949 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Schmitz v. Stockman, 151 Kan. 891, 101 P. 2d 962 (1940).
58United States v. Regensberg & Sons, 221 F. 2d 336 (2d Cir. 1955). Also see
Knight v. Knight, 71 N.Y. S. 2d 337, where an assignment of wages as se-
curity to pay off a debt was held to be a pledge and given priority over the
federal tax lien, if the assignment is for a past debt.
57Reg. Sec. 301-6323-1(a) (2), 6323(e) of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Mar-
teney United States, 245 F. 2d 135 (10th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Scovel,
348 U.S. 218 (1955); Nat'l. Refining v. United States, 160 F. 2d 951 (8th
Cir. 1947).58 United States v. Canadian American Co. Inc., 202 F. 2d 751 (2d Cir. 1953). If
the transfer is without consideration the government may proceed as in a
transfer in fraud cases. Leighton v. United States, 289 U.S. 506 (1933) ; Payne
v. United States, 247 F. 2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957).
59 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).60 United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
61 United States v. Hawkins, 228 F. 2d 517 (5th Cir.) 1955).
62 United States v. Kings County Iron Works, 224 F. 2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955).
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the property involved.63 If recording is required after judgment is
obtained, or if a levy is required, or if a certificate of judgment lien
is required to be filed, the priority does not apply until that specific act
is done to effect a judgment lien.64
The "judgment creditor" argument was employed by the City of
Walpole, New Hampshire to induce the court to grant the state tax
assessment priority, since under the state law of New Hampshire the
city was given the status of a judgment creditor. The court in United
States v. Gilbert Associates65 rebuffed the state, and held that the term
"judgment creditor" was limited to "the usual conventional sense of a
judgment of a court of record." The term "judgment creditor" does
not apply to quasi-judicial decisions, or decisions by commissions or
bureaus .6
Another exception to the general tax lien law is a security in the
hands of certain transferees. A "security" is a bond, debenture, note,
share of stock, certificates of deposit, negotiable instruments, etc.
As to the foregoing, a general tax lien, even though recorded is not
valid against a mortgagee, pledgee or purchaser or adequate and full
consideration, unless such person had actual notice of the tax lien.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 6323(c) (1). This is true re-
gardless of when the transaction is completed and applies to husband
and wife if proper consideration passes and the spouse has no knowl-
edge of the tax lien. United States v. Rosebush, 45 F. Supp. 664
(E.D. Wis. 1942). The purpose of the exception is to facilitate
normal securities transactions, particularly in stock transfers of negoti-
able instruments. Enforcement of a tax lien against bona fide purchas-
ers would seriously impede commercial transactions.
The Circular Priority Headache
The priority of the federal tax lien creates new problems when a
third lien enters the arena.6 7 For example, suppose we have a real
estate tax lien or a mechanic's lien which by state law is prior to the
real estate mortgage lien but subordinate to a federal lien under fed-
eral law. We have a situation where the mechanic's lien is prior to
63 Reg. Sec. 301-6323-1 (a) (2) Miller v. Bk. of Amer., 166 F. 2d 415 (9th Cir.
1948); Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1957).64 Miller v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assoc., 166 F. 2d 415
(9th Cir. 1948). In any event, what is a "judgment creditor" is a federal
question. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953).65345 U.S. 361 (1953). See United States v. England, 226 F. 2d 205 (9th Cir.
1955), relying upon the Gilbert Associates case. The England case arose in
bankruptcy.66 Reg. Sec. 301-6323-1(a) (2), Miller v. Bank of Amer., 166 F. 2d 415 (9th
Cir. 1948); Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1957).67 See Otis, Circuity of Liens-a First Rate Legal Puzzle in ABA Proceedings,
Sec. of Real Property, etc. (Part II 5 (1956). Also see Perry, Priority of
Liens against Real Property, etc. 1953-54, 361-371 (University of Michigan
Law School Legislative Center, 1955).
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the mortgage; yet the mortgage is prior to the federal lien and the
federal lien is prior to the mechanic's lien.6s We find ourselves in a
priority circle. If the realty affected by the circle of priority is fore-
closed and the sale is insufficient to pay all the liens, it is the
mortgagee who must suffer. The solution to the problem logically but
not legally, could begin at any place in the circle, and every solution
can be said to be unfair depending upon who winds up last. Some
courts have argued for the division of the inadequate fund on a pro
rata basis. 9 However, the United States Supreme Court has spoken
in United States v. City of Britain.7" Here the court respected the state
law to prefer the statutory lien and admitted at the same time its inabil-
ity to reduce the federal tax lien. The court held that no more than the
amount of the mortgagee's lien can be given preference over the fed-
eral tax lien and if the state wanted the statutory tax or local lien to
have preference over the mortgage, it had to be taken out of the
mortgagee's share.71 No solution in the present state of the law is a
fair one. The result of the court decisions is to give priority to the
later filed federal tax lien over the prior recorded mortgage to the
extent of the amount of the lien preferred by local law. However, if
the state law affords no priority to the local lien, then the mortgagee's
interest is not impaired. 72
Proposed Statutory Changes
In an effort to persuade congress to legislate decency, fairness and
equity into the tax law, the American Bar Association has offered
many proposals and suggested legislation.7" In general, the recom-
mended draft divides the legislation into three titles. Title I seeks to
protect the security of those who extend credit on the faith of con-
tractual or statutory liens on the taxpayers' property, i.e., mechanic's
lien cases and surety lien cases. It would clarify the procedural rights
and remedies of third parties whose property rights are invaded or
threatened with seizure to pay the taxes of the taxpayer.
68 Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs, 246 F. 2d 141 (5th Cir. 1957). South-
ern Ohio Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Bolce, 135 N.E. 2d 382 (Ohio
1956) ; United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1953) ; Riverview Ceme-
tery Co. v. Busczyk, 144 A. 2d 406 (Del. 1958).
69 Bank of Amer. v. Green, 55-2 USTC 9658.
7o 347 U.S. 81 (1953).
71 The same solution was applied in Exchange Bank & Tr. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg.
Co., 246 F. 2d 141 (5th Cir. 1957); an interesting situation arises when a
the problem by totaling the mortgages and taking the local tax prepaid under
state law out of the second mortgage. See Ohio Savings Bank v. Boice, 165
Ohio St. 201, 135 N.E. 2d 832 (1956). Also see Southern Ohio Savings Bank
v. Boice (Ohio 1956) 135 N.E. 2d 382. In the matter of Lieb Bros. (D.C.N.J.
1957) 150 F. Supp. 68.
72 Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, et al, 247 F. 2d 777 (9th Cir.
1957).
7 See final report of the Committee on Federal Liens. This may be obtained
from the office of the ABA for $1.00 per copy at 1155 E. 60th St., Chicago,
Ill. Draft of the proposed legislation is in the appendix of the report. See
Resolutions of the ABA in 44 ABA Journal 384 (April, 1958).
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Title II seeks to make the government's lien position in non-bank-
ruptcy, i.e., solvency cases, similar to that accorded under the National
-Bankruptcy Act. Title III involves legislation to remove clouds on
title resulting from the existence of subordinate federal liens by forc-
ing the United States to be joined in actions involving issues of liens,
and by making the government bound by the doctrine of Lis Pendens.
When the unfiled tax liena rises after a suit is filed involving the title to
property, it is also suggested that the government intervene in all ac-
tions, after due notice, where there is a threat to the government lien;
and that the government may be interpleaded when it asserts a claim
to a debt or property to which others have adverse claims.
To recapitulate the lien law of federal tax lien priority based upon
recent cases we must reach the following conclusions:
1. Federal law determines the validity of a commercial, private
or state lien.
2. To compete with a federal lien, the private or state lien must
be choate and perfected in the federal sense.
3. The tests of whether a private or state lien is choate are:79
a. property subject to lien must be established.
b. the identity of the competing lienor must be definite and
certain.
c. the private or state lien must be an exact amount which
has been fixed with the finality of a judgment, or other-
wise definitely ascertained.
4. Security for a future or contingent obligation may be futile.
One thing should be determined by the discussion: that if one
practices law at the creditors' level, it requires taking a possessory,
present, definite security and not a future or changeable one in order
to beat the tax grab.
What we have said does not basically concern tax problems, but
property problems. The issue is not between the government and de-
linquent taxpayers but between the government and third parties who
owe the government nothing. The secret lien is destroying property
rights of third parties who have often created that property which
the government grabs for the taxes of another. Nothing has come closer
to confiscation of property, and the fact that the government has a $77
billion budget and debt of approximately $300 billion does not justify
the inequity in the law. Little wonder that the American Bar association
and others have risen up, screaming for legislation to overcome these
S74As set forth in United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1953) the
court there said "The liens may also be perfected in the sense that there is
nothing more to be done to have a choate lien--when the identity of the lienor,
the property subject to the lien and the amount of the lien are established.
Under these circumstances, first in time is first in right.
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gross inequities in the law. 75 Judicial proliferation of the doctrine of
the inchoate lien has confused and confiscated property rights and
secured transactions, and endangers the security of every lender in one
way or another. Uniform selective rules should be enacted by Congress
to do justice to the other lienors while protecting the needs of govern-
ment income. Without some legislative reform commercial relation-
ships will remain chaotic, uncertain and upsetting, and continue to
shock the conscience of every thinking lawyer. 7,
7 See: Federal Tax Liens: Proprosed Revision of the Law, William T. Plumb,
Jr., A.B.J., April, 1959, for an excellent discussion of the American Bar
Association's proposal for new legislation.
76 The writer has always felt that the courts could very easily and logically
hold for the equitable owner of property in the mechanic lien cases and the
land contract cases merely by recognizing the state law as to property rights
and priorities, yet reserving to itself the right to determine priority as a
federal question. We cannot escape the conclusion that if a state has a right
by the Constitution to determine property rights that even a tax law can be
confiscation at the taking of property without due process of law. Certainly
history again emphasizes that the "power to tax is the power to destroy."
The great American tax tragedy is that the government does not destroy the
taxpayers-only the innocent third parties.
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